Bad History: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication by Green, Steven K.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 81
Issue 5 Symposium: The (Re)Turn to History in
Religion Clause Law and Scholarship
Article 2
6-1-2006
Bad History: The Lure of History in Establishment
Clause Adjudication
Steven K. Green
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven K. Green, Bad History: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1717 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol81/iss5/2




"'For certainty in the law a little bad history is not too high a price
to pay."
2
History has been a popular source of authority for constitutional
adjudication for many years.3 This stands to reason, as American law
is generally a precedent-based system, and constitutional law in partic-
ular turns on interpreting a 215-year-old document. Yet despite the
ubiquity of historical authority in constitutional interpretation, in no
area has such reliance been more noticeable (and notable) than in
Establishment Clause cases.
This observation is, of course, neither profound nor original. Jus-
tice Rutledge made his pithy observation about the importance of his-
tory for Religion Clause controversies more than fifty-five years ago in
the first modern establishment case.4 Whether Rutledge's statement
served as an invitation or a premonition, since 1947 lawyers and
© Steven K. Green. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. J.D., University of
Texas; Ph.D., History, University of North Carolina.
1 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); John
Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 25 (1949).
2 CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 195 (1969)
(quoting William S. Holdsworth, The Place of English Legal History in the Education of
English Lawyers, in ESSAYS IN LAw AND HISTORY 20, 24-25 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Han-
bury eds., 1946)).
3 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-09, 432-36 (1857).
4 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
("No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its gen-
erating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.").
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judges have used history with abandon to justify their arguments and
decisions about the proper relationship between church and state.5
So, the question arises whether the recent spate of historically-
based scholarship, 6 arguments and holdings in Supreme Court estab-
lishment cases 7 represents anything new. The short answer is "no,"
and, of course, "yes." Although the recent occurrence of historically
oriented cases may be explained by the randomness of the particular
controversies or "cycles in history," something different is afoot. Not
since the mid-1980s-and the 1940s before then-has the lure of his-
tory been so dominant in Religion Clause jurisprudence. But since
that last epoch, the story that has been emerging from the historical
record has been vastly different than before. Due to an upsurge in
revisionist histories since the mid-1980s, 8 the historical account has
increasingly been hostile to the separationist position represented by
the Jeffersonian-Madisonian position recounted in Everson v. Board of
Education.9 Those who once criticized or marginalized the signifi-
cance of the history are now embracing it, and those who once felt the
comfort of having "history on their side" now find themselves on the
defensive. But the most significant aspect of this renewed interest in
history is the growing awareness-and lack thereof-about the appro-
priate uses of history in Supreme Court adjudication. The remaining
"separationists" on the Court-inspired by former Justice Brennan-
have recognized the errors of Justice Black's Everson approach and
now call for limits on historical analysis in judicial decisionmaking. 10
5 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-58, 266-78
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-30 (1962); Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-47 (1961); id. at 484-95 (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213-25 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 244-48 (Reed, J., dissenting); Everson, 330 U.S. at
8-15; id. at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
6 See, e.g., DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMASJEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (2002).
7 See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (holding that display of
Ten Commandments on grounds of state capitol did not violate Establishment
Clause); McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 (2005) (upholding prelimi-
nary injuction barring display of Ten Commandments on the ground that the county
had a "predominantly religious purpose" in erecting the display).
8 See sources cited infra notes 68-71.
9 330 U.S. 1, 11-13, 18.
10 See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2882-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); McCreary, 125 S.
Ct. at 2742-45.
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Still, Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom 1 and
James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance12 remain the separation-
ists' Holy Grail. 13 In contrast, the Court's "accommodationists," now
enjoying fruits from the tree of history, are engaging in some of the
worst historical analysis imaginable. Justices Scalia and Thomas's ob-
session with "originalism," and the latter's recent advocacy of reverse
incorporation, are the latest examples. 14 Despite more than forty
years of criticism by the historical academy, 15 "bad history" abounds in
Religion Clause jurisprudence.
This Article argues that because bad history is so prevalent in Re-
ligion Clause adjudication, history as an analytical tool should be cir-
cumscribed. 16 While history serves as an indispensable source of
information, inspiration, and even authority for some Establishment
Clause controversies, its role and effectiveness in Supreme Court adju-
dication are necessarily limited. History can never provide specific an-
swers to modern controversies; neither can history tell us what the
Founders may have thought about future church-state conflicts or, in
many instances, even about the church-state conflicts they faced. The
historical record is too amorphous and too easily misread or manipu-
lated to resolve modern controversies. In essence, the very attempt to
use history to answer current constitutional questions is a misuse of the
historical craft. At best, history can only inform; it cannot resolve le-
gal controversies.
11 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779), re-
printed in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
12 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),
in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
13 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870-72 (2000) (Souter,J., dissenting).
14 See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
15 See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION
AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 10-11 (1965) ("By building
constitutional law on history thus oversimplified, the Court has widened the gap be-
tween current social reality and current constitutional law."); H.Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885, 948 (1985) ("It is com-
monly assumed that the 'interpretive intention' of the Constitution's framers was that
the Constitution would be construed in accordance with . . . the framers' own pur-
poses, expectations, and intentions. Inquiry shows that assumption to be incorrect.").
16 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitu-
tional Justice, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1611, 1622 (1997) ("[T]here is too much history in
constitutional interpretation as it is practiced today.").
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Part I of this Article briefly traces the Court's use of historical
analysis and documents the historical shift (pardon the pun) in the
substantive answers to the Court's historical inquiries. Part II dis-
cusses the appropriate uses of history in Establishment Clause adjudi-
cation and recommends a model of analysis. In so doing, this author
is not so bold as to pronounce the "correct" method of historical anal-
ysis in constitutional cases. As the author of three "historian's" briefs
in recent Court cases, I too have felt the lure of "law office history. ' 17
Part III then critiques four more recent controversies: the persistence
of "originalism;" the relevance of the Blaine Amendment in religious
funding cases (Locke v. Davey18 ); the Ten Commandments and Pledge
of Allegiance cases (McCreary County v. ACLU,19 Van Orden v. Perry;20
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdov 2 1 ); and Justice Thomas's ad-
vocacy of a "federalism" approach to establishment cases.
I. A TORTURED PATH
"The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in
its history."2 2
No case is more responsible for introducing the historical
method in Establishment Clause adjudication than Everson v. Board of
Education.23 Justice Black-with help from Justice Rutledge-resur-
rected from obscurity Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom
and Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance and turned the two docu-
ments into constitutional canon.24 As is a familiar saga, Everson ele-
vated Jefferson and Madison to semi-god status, making them the
authoritative expositors on the meaning of nonestablishment and free
17 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Legal Historians and Law Scholars on Behalf of
Respondents, McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (No. 03-1693), 2005
WL 166586; Brief Amicus Curiae of Historians and Law Scholars in Support of Re-
spondent, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 2004 WL 298112; Brief Amicus Curiae of
Historians and Law Scholars on Behalf of Petitioners, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712
(2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697729.
18 540 U.S. 712.
19 125 S. Ct. 2722.
20 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
21 542 U.S. 1.
22 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
24 See id. at 11-13. As Justice Rutledge remarked in his Everson dissent, these
documents from the "Virginia struggle for religious liberty... became [the] warp and
woof of our constitutional tradition." Id. at 39 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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exercise as found in the First Amendment.25 Black interpreted the
command of the Bill and Memorial in simple and stark terms.26 Black
reaffirmed the validity of relying on history to resolve constitutional
questions the following year in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Edu-
cation.27 Significantly, Black's historical approach and interpretations
did not raise dissent on the Court. Justices Rutledge (in Everson28)
and Frankfurter (in McCollumP29) fully embraced the relevance of his-
tory, the significance of Black's sources, and the interpretations to be
drawn therefrom, only arguing for a stricter application of those prin-
ciples. OnlyJustice Reed in McCollum expressed some reservation, re-
marking that a "rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of
speech." 30
For all of its attributes (e.g., correct holding and identification of
the significant principles and sources), Everson is an example of "bad
history." Although the Bill for Religious Freedom and the Memorial
and Remonstrance are seminally important documents, Black's analysis
was stilted. He failed to examine the legislative history of the drafting
and ratification of the First Amendment, consider other important
historical sources or acknowledge that competing views may have ex-
isted at the time of the Constitution's drafting and ratification. But
more than anything, Black's decision falsely professed that the two
documents provided definitive answers to modern questions of trans-
portation reimbursements and release-time religious instruction, 31
likely two issues that had not occurred to either Jefferson or Madison.
Black thus built a mansion on a foundation of sand: the Bill and Me-
25 Id. at 13 (majority opinion) (declaring that Madison and Jefferson played
"leading roles").
26 Id. at 15-16 ("The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organization or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State."'
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878))).
27 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) ("[A]s we said in the Everson case, the First Amend-
ment has erected a wall between Church and State which must be kept high and
impregnable.").
28 330 U.S. at 28-63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
29 333 U.S. at 212-32 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
30 Id. at 247 (Reed, J., dissenting).
31 Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-15 (majority opinion); see also id. at 44-45 (Rutledge,J.,
dissenting) (critiquing Black's undiluted use of Madison's and Jefferson's writings).
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morial were not merely instructive but conclusive;, the historical ap-
proach was indisputable (although a fuller account of history did not
matter).
Criticism (some well deserved) was quick. Edward Corwin, John
Courtney Murray, James O'Neill, and Mark DeWolfe Howe decried
the Court's selective use of historical documents and the claim of in-
fallibility that accompanied that history, now revealed. 3 2 As Howe as-
serted, "The complexities of history deserve our respect. ' 33 Instead,
the Court was "building constitutional law upon history... oversimpli-
fied. '34 Howe's chief complaint, however, was not with the Court's
reliance on historical authority but that its use in Everson was incom-
plete and misleading. Howe offered only one specific alternative-an
evangelical basis for separation35-and apparently would have been
satisfied with the Court's analytical approach had his preferred view
been included. He did not address the more troubling questions of
completeness, proper use, and ultimate relevance of history.
The blistering critiques of Everson and McCollum did little to dis-
suade later excursions into the historical record. Part of the problem
was that the Court was faced with constitutional challenges to long-
standing practices that seemed anachronistic in an increasingly secu-
lar culture: Sunday closing laws; tax exemptions for houses of worship;
public school prayer and Bible reading. Such practices could not be
reconciled with the Establishment Clause without reconciling the his-
tory as well. McGowan v. Maryland36 and Walz v. Tax Commission3 7 in-
vited rather straightforward historical inquiries into discrete,
longstanding practices, although both holdings engaged in the fallacy
that the Framers exercised a consistency of thought when condoning
32 HowE, supra note 15, at 3 (arguing that the Court's close focus on Virginia's
church-state experience forced the complex issue into "such a confining frame of
reference as to make impossible anything more significant than a parochial gloss on
Jefferson's metaphor"); J.M. ONEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTI-
TUTION 224 (1949) (claiming that the McCollum opinion represented a "gross misrep-
resentation" of Jefferson); Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School
Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (1949) ("Do historical data, on the whole, sustain
[the Court's view of the Establishment Clause in McCollum] ? The answer is, not in
such a way or such a sense as to vindicate the McCollum decision."); Murray, supra
note 1, at 25 ("What needs justification is the absoluteness of the doctrine; and at this
point the Court fails.").
33 HowE, supra note 15, at 176.
34 Id. at 10-11.
35 Id. at 15, 19.
36 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
37 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
"BAD HISTORY"
those practices. 38 Justice Clark's opinion in School District v. Schempp 39
punted the issue of reconciling the past practice of school prayer to
Justice Brennan who, sensing the unpredictability of history, urged
caution in its command. 40 A "too literal quest for the advice of the
Founding Fathers" upon modern controversies was "futile and misdi-
rected," Brennan cautioned. 41 The historical record "is at best ambig-
uous, and statements can readily be found to support either side of
[any] proposition."42 Instead, the Court's use of the history of the
Founding "must limit itself to broad purposes, not specific prac-
tices."43 Brennan, however, fell off the wagon of historical sobriety in
Lemon v. Kurtzman44 by asserting that history revealed a "consensus"
that public subsidy of religious schooling resulted in impermissible
entanglement. 45
For the first forty years of modem Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, the Court's resort to history generally reinforced separationist
principles, primarily because of the commanding stature of Everson's
Jeffersonian-Madisonian interpretation. 46 In the mid-1980s, the tide
began to turn. In 1982, Professor Robert L. Cord published his highly
influential revisionist history of the creation of the Religion Clauses,
Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction.47
Cord's attack was two-fold: to document early practices and attitudes
that conflicted with the accepted Jeffersonian-Madisonian interpreta-
tion; and-even more heretical-to challenge the separationist pedi-
grees of the great men themselves. 48 Justice Rehnquist relied
extensively on Cord's analysis in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree,49
38 See id. at 677 (noting that Congress in 1802 adopted a taxing statute for Alex-
andria that contained an exemption for houses of worship); McGowan, 366 U.S. at 438
(noting that in the same year (1785) that Madison sponsored the Bill for Religious
Freedom he introduced a "Bill for Punishing . . .Sabbath Breakers").
39 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40 Id. at 237-38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 237.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 241.
44 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45 Id. at 648-49 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46 No doubt, the longevity of that interpretation had much to do with the influ-
ence of Leo Pfeffer, both in and out of court. See LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND
FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1967).
47 ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION (1982).
48 Id. at xiv. An earlier revisionist monograph that was influential in conservative
circles was MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE Au-
THORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978).
49 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist,.J., dissenting).
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which presented the first significant internal rebuttal to the Court's
long-standing interpretation of the Founding period. Rehnquist mini-
mized the significance of Jefferson (in France at the critical time) 50
and distinguished the Virginia struggle from the drafting of the First
Amendment, 51 concluding that there is "simply no historical founda-
tion for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the 'wall
of separation' that was constitutionalized in Everson."52 "The true
meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history,"' 53
Rehnquist insisted, "but no amount of repetition of historical errors in
judicial opinions can make the errors true."54 Though stinging, Rehn-
quist's critique was half-hearted: he criticized the Everson account but
acknowledged the command of history. He did not explain how to
reconcile conflicting accounts of history (other than to accept his al-
ternative version) or the weight that should be afforded historical evi-
dence in constitutional adjudication.
The two most significant decisions applying a historical analysis
during the 1980s were, of course, Marsh v. Chambers5 5 and Lynch v.
Donnelly.56 In Marsh, Chief Justice Burger foreswore the established
analytical standard (Lemon v. Kurtzman57 ) to rely on historical evi-
dence to validate the practice of legislative chaplains. 58 Highlighting
that the First Congress authorized the appointment of paid chaplains
only three days after approving the Bill of Rights, Burger concluded
that "[c]learly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion
Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as
a violation of that Amendment. 59 Not only was that action conclusive
for the legal inquiry; Burger found reinforcement from an "unambig-
uous and unbroken history of more than 200 years. '60 While histori-
cal patterns could not justify contemporary constitutional violations,
here the historical record conclusively indicated "what the draftsmen
50 Id. at 92.
51 Id. at 92-99.
52 Id. at 106.
53 Id. at 113.
54 Id. at 107. Justice Rehnquist's polemic led Justice O'Connor to respond in her
concurrence that "[a]lthough history provides a touchstone for constitutional
problems, the Establishment Clause concern for religious liberty is dispositive here,"
suggesting that important religious liberty values exist independent of the historical
experience. Id. at 81 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
56 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
57 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
58 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-92.
59 Id. at 788.
60 Id. at 792.
[VOL. 81:51724
0 'BAD HISTORY"
intended the Establishment Clause to mean," as if that intent was pel-
lucid to any observer. 6 1 The following year in Lynch-the creche
case-Burger again searched for what "history reveals," finding that
there was "an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all
three branches of government of the role of religion in American life
from at least 1789."62 "[Clontemporaneous understanding [s]" of the
Establishment Clause by the First Congress "take[ ] on special signifi-
cance" for present-day application of the constitutional principles.
63
Both opinions represent egregious examples of bad history. By
extrapolating meaning from general historical facts removed from
their context and announcing their commanding relevance for cur-
rent practices, Chief Justice Burger committed what Martin Flaherty
has described as the error of "poorly supported generalization [s] .64
Burger's opinions also assumed the Framers maintained an ever-pre-
sent awareness of constitutional values and were forever consistent in
applying those principles. As Justice Souter has noted more recently,
"Although evidence of historical practice can indeed furnish valuable
aid in the interpretation of contemporary language, [some official]
acts... prove only that public officials, no matter when they serve, can
turn a blind eye to constitutional principle. '6 5 And finally, both opin-
ions presuppose that the Constitution is "a static document whose
meaning on every detail is fixed for all time by the life experience of
the Framers," which binds all future generations. 66
Despite relying on historical methods in lieu of the Lemon test,
neither Marsh nor Lynch presented a direct challenge to the Everson
rendition of the Founding. Still, both cases represented a watershed,
inviting a reexamination of the accepted historical account. In addi-
tion to Cord's book,6 7 revisionist studies by Gerard Bradley, 6s Michael
McConnell, 69 Daniel Dreisbach, 70 Rodney Smith 71 and others chal-
lenged the Everson rendition. Those critiques and the issues they
61 Id. at 790.
62 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-74.
63 Id.
64 Martin S. Flaherty, Histoy "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 523, 526 (1995).
65 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616 n.3 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
66 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 816 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
68 See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987).
69 See Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 933 (1986).
70 See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADow: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987).
71 See RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION 125-28 (1987).
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raised influenced subsequent Court briefing and found their way into
exchanges between the Justices. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,72 Jus-
tice Kennedy argued that rather than Marsh representing an excep-
tion to the "otherwise broad sweep of the Establishment Clause," it
indicated that the Clause was "to be determined by reference to his-
torical practices and understandings. '7 3 This led Justice Blackmun to
respond that regardless of strong evidence of earlier government ac-
tions endorsing religion, "history [could] not legitimate practices that
demonstrate government's allegiance to a particular sect or creed. '74
Similar exchanges over the relevance of history for Establishment
Clause adjudication and the proper interpretations to draw from the
record appeared in Lee v. Weisman between Justices Souter and
Scalia 7 5 in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia be-
tween Justices Thomas and Souter, 76 in Mitchell v. Helms between Jus-
tices Thomas and Souter,77 and in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris between
Justices Thomas and Souter.78
Several factors are significant in these more recent exchanges.
First, the Court's earlier consensus of fealty to the Everson account is
gone. Going a step beyond Justice Rehnquist's Wallace critique, Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas are now reinterpreting Jefferson and
Madison's works to allow for nonpreferential aid to religious institu-
tions and for government acknowledgments of religion. According to
Justice Scalia, history imposes no requirement that government be
neutral between religion and nonreligion, and even supports prefer-
ential treatment of monotheism over other belief systems. 79 Under
this truncated view, the prohibition on religious establishments ex-
tends only to government "'coercion of religious orthodoxy and of
72 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
73 Id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
74 Id. at 603 (majority opinion); accord id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
75 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-26 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); id. at
632-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852-63 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 868-74 (Souter, J., dissenting).
77 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at
870-72 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78 Zelnan v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); id. at 711-12 (Souter,J., dissenting).
79 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748-53 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 2753 ("[I]t is entirely clear from our Nation's historical practices that the
Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in uncon-
cerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.").
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financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.'- 80 Second, the
Court's more conservative members are more comfortable relying on
historical arguments and accepting the conclusiveness of historical au-
thority. Most recently in Van Orden v. Peny,8 Justice Thomas confi-
dently asserted that "our task would be far simpler if we returned to
the original meaning of the word 'establishment' than it is under the
various approaches this Court now uses,"8 2 while in McCreary, Justice
Scalia defiantly claimed that contemporaneous "official actions show
what ... [the Establishment Clause] meant."8 3 And, relatedly, Justices
Scalia and Thomas have asserted that an originalist approach is the
correct way to interpret the historical record. 4
Finally, this new interpretation of the historical record surround-
ing the Religion Clauses has received support from two recent influen-
tial works, Philip Hamburger's Separation of Church and State,85 and
Daniel Dreisbach's Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between
Church and State.86 Both books are thorough in their coverage and
meticulously researched. But both works are highly revisionist in their
interpretations and conclusions, asserting that the Everson version of
church-state separation was alien not only to contemporaries of the
Founding but also to Jefferson and Madison themselves (except in
their more extreme moments). A full critique of both works would
take more space than is available and would only repeat many of the
comments contained in Douglas Laycock's thorough analysis of
Hamburger's book.87 The important point here is that both works
have received considerable attention in the press, the academy and,
more significantly, in Court briefings and opinions.8 8 The positive re-
ception of Hamburger and Dreisbach's books further indicates the
80 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
81 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
82 Id. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83 125 S. Ct. at 2754 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring); McCreamy, 125 S. Ct. at
2754-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85 HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 3 (arguing that Americans "transformed their
religious liberty" by shifting the meaning of the Establishment Clause from disestab-
lishment to separation).
86 DREISBACH, supra note 6, at 5 (arguing that Jefferson's "wall" metaphor never
attained "great currency" until the mid-twentieth century).
87 See Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1667
(2003) (reviewing HAMBURGER, supra note 6).
88 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 54 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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about-face in the way in which history is being used in Establishment
Clause adjudication today.
II. IN SEARCH OF A USABLE HISTORY
"Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are une-
quivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred."89
The lure of history for constitutional adjudication is irresistible.
History legitimizes legal arguments and judicial decisionmaking by of-
fering an aura of authority and objectivity. 90 Relatedly, history pur-
portedly serves as an external constraint on judicial subjectivity by
providing an independent and apolitical source of information from
which all parties can draw and upon which all people can agree. 91
History also serves an important symbolic and rhetorical function by
"reconcil [ing] the American faith in popular sovereignty with the jus-
tice-seeking Constitution. ' 92 And as noted above, constitutional adju-
dication relies on interpreting a 215-year-old document. As a result,
modern constitutional theory can fairly be described-in the 'words of
Larry Kramer-as "'Founding obsessed' in its use of history. '93 The
Founding has become that incomparable and seminal event in Ameri-
can history, such that we treat it as "conclusive and sacred"94 and the
Constitution's authors and ratifiers as special and privileged in their
apparent understanding of its contents. 95
Whether we ask about these Foundings because what the Founders
thought binds us today, or because we need to translate their as-
sumptions and values to present circumstances, or in order to syn-
89 THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 138 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1961).
90 See HowE, supra note 15, at 167-68; H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Oiginalists,
73 VA. L. REV. 659, 660 (1987); Scalia, supra note 14, at 864.
91 As one of the few points upon which Justice Scalia and Erwin Chemerinsky
apparently agree, judges "want very much to make it appear that their decisions are
not based on their personal opinions, but instead are derived from an external
source." Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amend-
ment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 908 (1993); see Scalia, supra note 14, at 852.
92 Eisgruber, supra note 16, at 1622; see also Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through His-
tory (Or to It), 65 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1594 (1997) ("We can think of the role that
appeals to history play in the composition ofjudicial opinions not as the reasons driv-
ing decisions, but as an attractive rhetorical method of reassuring citizens that courts
are acting consistently with deeply held values.").
93 Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-And Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627,
1628 (1997).
94 THE FEDERALIST No. 20 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton), supra note
89, at 138.
95 Kramer, supra note 93, at 1627.
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thesize them with commitments made during other Foundings, the
historical inquiry in constitutional interpretation is disproportion-
ately devoted to understanding these discrete moments.9 6
As a result, modern Americans are "held captive by the success of the
eighteenth-century Founding Fathers. ' 97 When it comes to the Relig-
ion Clauses, the accepted wisdom-at least until recently-was that no
one was more important than Jefferson and Madison, the two high
priests of religious liberty, with their sacred texts, the Memorial and
Virginia Bill, becoming the Decalogue (albeit now with fifteen pro-
nouncements) and Great Commission of the First Amendment. As
discussed above, although that account is now being called into ques-
tion, the Founding still retains its controlling significance.
Not only do we treat the Founding as unique and special; we tend
to see it as a static and completed event. It is as if all human knowl-
edge and wisdom came together for one brief fifteen-year moment;
that long-developing notions of democracy, freedom, equality, and
civic virtue reached their apex between 1775 and 1790 and ceased
developing, particularly from the perspective of the Founders. The
Founding, it seems, is that moment in time when the Founders "be-
queathed their values and deeds to the present."9 8 But this perspec-
tive is triply flawed, first by ignoring the long development of ideas
and the myriad, incremental experiences that shaped eighteenth-cen-
tury Republican theory. 99 Second, it suggests a past that was unified
and positive-that we can capture those "agreed-upon historical
truths" if only they can be identified (and that its "truths" should be
accepted uncritically). 00 Finally, such a perspective is untrue to the
Founders themselves who saw history and the political theories they
were espousing as a process, not something static.1 0
A fundamental point of departure between historians and jurists
is the notion of "historical truths." Historians, with their canon of ob-
jectivity, do not mine the pages of historical information to uncover
"truths"; the study of history is not to provide "answers" to modern
questions but to provide understanding of our past in the hope it may
96 Id. at 1628.
97 MILLER, supra note 2, at 174; accord Kramer, supra note 93, at 1627 (noting that
manyjUrists treat the Founding as "special and privileged ... without making it fully
determinative or conclusive").
98 MILLER, supra note 2, at 175.
99 See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 (1969).
100 See MILLER, supra note 2, at 176.
101 Id. at 172-73.
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illuminate the present. 0 2 In contrast, constitutional lawyers primarily
approach history as advocates seeking authority for the propositions
they hope to prove. The lure of uncovering "truths" in that record is
irresistible. Not that this difference in purpose and approach renders
the lawyer's craft invalid; the practical application of historical inquir-
ies can serve legitimate and important ends. 10 3 However, the impor-
tant starting point is to recognize that historians-through their
product upon which constitutional lawyers often rely-do not set out
"to answer the kinds of questions that constitutional interpreters must
resolve." 104
Despite their commitment to objectivity, historians also under-
stand-in a manner that is apparently incongruous to many jurists-
that history is not objective. Any exploration into history is selective,
and all (good) accounts of history are interpretive. 10 5 The difference
is that historians recognize the selective and interpretive aspect to
their craft-jurists often act as if such "shortcomings" are inconsistent
with a historical analysis instead of being part of the undertaking. 0 6
The misplaced search for historical "facts" prevents any acknowledg-
ment of the inherently selective and interpretive nature of historical
research. Relatedly, jurists often fail to understand the indeterminacy
of the historical record. Again, concrete historical "facts" or "truths"
rarely exist. 0 7
The drawbacks to primary reliance on historical records are
many. First, it must be recognized that the historical record of any
period-the Founding period being no exception-is always incom-
plete. We have only those documents that have survived the ravages
of time and have been transcribed, compiled, and published. 10 8
There can be no doubt that other important, unrecorded conversa-
102 See generally DAVID HAcKETr FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC
OF HISTOicAL THOUGHT 314-17 (1970) (discussing what history can and cannot
teach people about how to order their lives in the present and stating that "[i]f we
continue to pursue the ideological objectives of the nineteenth century in the middle
of the twentieth, the prospects for the twenty-first are increasingly dim").
103 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 601, 602
(1995).
104 Rebecca L. Brown, History for the Non-Originalist, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69,
71 (2003).
105 R. G. COt.LINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 9-11 (1946); FISCHER, supra note
102, at 4-5.
106 See Powell, supra note 90, at 660-61 ("Historical judgments ... necessarily in-
volve elements of creativity and interpretative choice.").
107 FISCHER, supra note 102, at 4-5.
108 SeeJames H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documen-
tary Record, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1, 38 (1986).
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tions and discussions about the purpose and meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause took place during meetings of the House Committee on
Style (which Madison chaired), in the House debates, and in the unre-
corded Senate debate that accompanied the proposals recorded in
the Senate Journal. And this does not include the possible host of
letters, pamphlets, and important notations written on loose scraps of
paper that are lost to time. In addition, the records that do exist may
be woefully inaccurate, as they were transcribed by people who made
mistakes and self-edited as they went along (not to mention allega-
tions that the transcriber for the Annals of Congress was frequently ine-
briated). 0 9 Madison stated that the accuracy of the reported debates
of the First Congress was "'not to be relied on."'1 10
The face of the debates shews that they are defective, and desultory,
where not revised, or written out by the Speakers. In some in-
stances, he makes them inconsistent with themselves, by erroneous
reports of their speeches at different times on the same subject.
[The reporter] was indolent and sometimes filled up blanks in his
notes from memory or imagination.11 1
The recorded debates of the state ratifying conventions-which, ac-
cording to Jack Rakove,1 12 are the more authoritative source of an
original understanding-are even less reliable.1 1 3
In addition, remarks contained within documents whose accuracy
can be presumed can easily be misunderstood. The Framers used
terms and phrases familiar to the late eighteenth century, and fre-
quently employed rhetoric that was intentionally vague, hyperbolic, or
duplicitous (or, at times, merely sloppy).114 Their remarks and letters
also arose within particular contexts that may not be apparent from
the documents themselves. Therefore, the precise meanings of re-
corded statements may be ambiguous at best.1 1 5 Also, persuasive evi-
109 See id. at 36 (discussing the excessive drinking of the reporter, Thomas Lloyd,
and relating that his notes were described as "frequently 'garbled' and that he ne-
glected to report speeches whose texts are known to exist elsewhere").
110 Id. at 38 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Jan. 7,
1832)).
111 Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Jan. 7, 1832)).
112 See Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 159, 160 (1996).
113 See Hutson, supra note 108, at 12-24 (noting the records are incomplete and
reveal politically motivated editing).
114 See Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST.
L.J. 409, 412 (1986).
115 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan,J., concurring)
(" [T] he historical record is at best ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to
support either side of the proposition. The ambiguity of history is understandable if
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dence exists that the Framers believed that constitutional
interpretation should be drawn from the express language of the doc-
ument, not from the statements of those who drafted the language.' 16
Thus, as Justice Brennan once remarked, "too literal quest for the ad-
vice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems...
futile and misdirected."' 17
Constitutional lawyers and judges must also recognize that all his-
torical evidence is not of equal merit or susceptible to the same forms
of analysis. Putting aside the argument that the Framers intended cer-
tain clauses of the Constitution to be open-ended and interpreted ac-
cording to contemporary values,"" a casual reading of the text
indicates that some provisions lend themselves more readily to exact
meanings (e.g., that the President shall have attained the age of thirty-
five years) than other vague clauses like the Establishment Clause. As
Justice Frankfurter stated, "Some words are confined to their history;
some are starting points for history." 119 When it comes to interpreting
those vague provisions in light of current controversies, some histori-
cal evidence is more authoritative than others. Material that is inter-
nal to a provision or law-such as comments by a drafter or specific
debate-deserves different attention than general historical material
that is external to the provision or law. 120 The problem with the
Court's use of general history as authority-as it did in Marsh, Lynch,
and Van Orden-is that it offers greater flexibility to select historical
data that supports its conclusions. At the same time the Court ven-
tures into general history for authority, it extends the Court's exper-
tise as an accurate expositor of historical events. 12 I Reliance on
we recall the nature of the problems uppermost in the thinking of the statesmen who
fashioned the religious guarantees; they were concerned with far more flagrant intru-
sions of government into the realm of religion than any that our century has
witnessed.").
116 See Powell, supra note 15, at 903-04 ("The Framers shared the traditional com-
mon law view-so foreign to much hermeneutical thought in more recent years-that
the import of the document they were framing would be determined by reference to
the intrinsic meaning of its words or through the usual judicial process of case-by-case
interpretation.").
117 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118 See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1127, 1127 (1987) ("The Framers thus intended courts to look outside the Constitu-
tion in determining the validity of certain government actions .... ").
119 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 537 (1947).
120 MILLER, supra note 2, at 21.
121 Id. at 25 ("General history not only takes the justices into fields where their
training and knowledge may be limited, but it also invites the avoidance of the more
strictly legal principles of decision.").
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general history invites the Court to commit the fallacy of overgeneral-
ization while it presents the real danger of the Court getting history
wrong. As Mark DeWolfe Howe observed, when the Court "endeavors
to write an authoritative chapter in the intellectual history of the
American people, as it does when it lays historical foundations be-
neath its readings of the First Amendment, then any distortion be-
comes a matter of consequence."' 1 22
What does this say about the value of the history for modern Re-
ligion Clause interpretation? First and foremost, judges and lawyers
must recognize the appropriate uses and corresponding limitations of
history for constitutional adjudication. Judges and lawyers should
avoid scouring the record for answers to modern questions that the
Framers may not have asked. As Philip Kurland has commented, his-
tory should not be expected "to provide specific answers to the spe-
cific problems that bedevil the Court."1 23 Rather, "[h]istory should
provide the perimeters within which the choice of meaning may be
made."'124 Also, "the Founding is a starting place, not a fixed refer-
ence point" that necessarily binds future generations. 125 "History
should figure in constitutional interpretation as an aid to the pursuit
of justice, not a constraint upon it."126
Second, judges and lawyers must acknowledge that all historical
accounts are selective and interpretive-that "objective facts" or "his-
torical truths" do not exist. By so doing,jurists will place the appropri-
ate emphasis on historical material while affording history its essential
autonomy from the present. 2 7
Third, lawyers and judges should resist drawing conclusions from
particular statements or events in the record. Even if we could agree
that history should bind us through the answers it provides, the mean-
ing of many events is too indeterminate to be of help. As Thomas
Curry has written, "[T] he meaning of the First Amendment must arise
out of its historical context rather than from a literalist reading [of the
documentary record]."1 28 That context, moreover, must be viewed in
its entirety, and not by emphasizing particular "facts" (e.g., that the
First Congress created a chaplain within three days of approving the
122 HowE, supra note 15, at 4.
123 Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. &
MARY L. Rv. 839, 842 (1986).
124 Id. at 841-42.
125 Kramer, supra note 93, at 1639.
126 Eisgruber, supra note 16, at 1611-12.
127 Powell, supra note 90, at 669.
128 THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENTF 222 (1986).
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language of the First Amendment) independent from their contem-
porary meaning. The Framers must also be afforded the privilege we
give to modern politicians of being obtuse, ambiguous, insincere, in-
complete, and contradictory in their rhetoric.
This does not mean, however, that no meaning can be drawn
from history. Recurring and consistent statements that reflect broad
principles or points of consensus can be instructive for modem appli-
cation of the Religion Clauses. Indeterminacy aside, it is not neces-
sary that the Framers reached any particular consensus on the
meaning and/or application of the Religion Clauses; it is sufficient
that they agreed on broad, general principles and viewed the Estab-
lishment Clause as facilitating those ends. Those principles that
emerge from the ratification debate and drafting of the Bill of Rights
include concerns for rights of conscience, no compelled support of
religion, no delegation of government authority to religious institu-
tions, and equal treatment of all sects.1 29 As Thomas Curry has
summed up those shared concerns:
[T]he people of almost every state that ratified the First Amend-
ment believed that religion should be maintained and supported
voluntarily. They saw government attempts to organize and regu-
late such support as a usurpation of power and a violation of liberty
of conscience and free exercise of religion, and as falling within the
scope of what they termed an establishment of religion.130
In essence, "our use of the history of their time must limit itself to
broad purposes, not specific practices."'9
31
III. CuRRENT HiSTORcAL APPLICATIONS
Applying the above observations, this Part considers and critiques
four recent examples of the Court's susceptibility to bad history.
A. Originalism
Originalism or "interpretivism" represents the substructure of his-
torical-legal analysis today; to one degree or another, all historical
analysis incorporates arguments that earlier understandings about
constitutional provisions matter today. But originalism is not so en-
compassing. Arising out of a desire to find an objective constitutional
methodology, originalism espouses a view that the meaning of consti-
129 See Steven K. Green, Of (Un)EqualJurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance
Between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REv. 1111, 1122-25 (2002) (identifying
various values underlying nonestablishment).
130 CuRRY, supra note 128, at 222.
131 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tutional provisions is limited to the textual language and/or the "in-
tentions" of the Framers.1 32 The issue raised by such a methodology is
to what extent those original intentions and understandings can be
accurately deciphered and the extent to which they should control
current constitutional interpretation. The modern version of
originalism was made popular by Professor Raoul Berger, 133 Judge
Robert Bork,1 34 and former Attorney General Edward Meese. 135 Al-
though the legal and historical academies quickly (and convincingly)
excoriated the originalist approach, it has maintained a loyal follow-
ing, primarily among legal conservatives.' 36 Today, most "originalist"
scholars may be characterized as "weak originalists," according to
Larry Kramer: "[tihat is, they treat the Founding as special and privi-
leged in some sense without making it fully determinative or conclu-
sive."' 137 On the Court, however, Justices Scalia and Thomas espouse a
stricter originalist line: that we can determine what the Framers in-
tended a particular constitutional provision to mean, and that re-
vealed understanding should control our interpretation and
application of that provision today.' 38 According to Scalia, an
132 See William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REv. 1237, 1240 (1986) (defining interpretivism as "the judicial practice of giving
meaning to a legal text in accordance with the original purposes or intentions of
those who enacted it"). However, no single definition of originalism exists. See
Brown, supra note 104, at 69-70 ("Even though there is no unanimity about what
originalism actually means, or what it calls upon judges to do in a close case, its adher-
ents gain a great deal by sharing one name that offers the appearance, if not the
reality, of agreement. They also gain the strategic advantage of claiming, by virtue of
their name alone, the baseline from which all departures must be justified.").
133 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT ByJuD c A 4 (2d ed. Liberty Fund 1997)
(1977) (arguing that the "'original intention' of the Framers" is binding on the Su-
preme Court).
134 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 8 (1971) ("Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be
preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed value to an) other. The
judge must stick close to the text and the history ... and not construct new rights.").
135 See Edwin Meese, I1, U.S. Attorney Gen., The Supreme Court of the United
States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, Address to the American Bar Association
(July 9, 1985), in 27 S. TEX. L. RE-v. 455, 456 (1986) (publishing Meese's speech to the
American Bar Association in Washington, D.C., on July 9, 1985, in which Meese states
that the Founders intended for judges to "resist any political effort to depart from the
literal provisions of the Constitution").
136 See generally Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5
CoNST. COMMENT. 77 (1988) (discussing the role for original intent in constitutional
interpretation); Powell, supra note 15 (discussing the Framers' understanding of
"original intention").
137 Kramer, supra note 93, at 1627.
138 See generally Scalia, supra note 14 (describing his personal view of originalism).
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originalist approach is tied to the legitimacy of judicial review;139 its
legal appeal rests on an argument that popular sovereignty is the su-
preme authority in a constitutional democracy. 140 Originalism leads
to consistency, predictability, and, most important for originalists, ju-
dicial fidelity to the text rather than to a judge's own ideological
predilections. 141
Aspects of an originalist methodology have been present in many
Establishment Clause decisions that have relied on historical analy-
sis-to an extent, it is evident in Everson. The view that an "original
understanding" does not simply inform constitutional decisionmaking
but predetermines outcomes is found most readily in Marsh, Lynch, and
Justice Rehnquist's Wallace dissent. 142 Though expressing fealty to
original understandings of the Religion Clauses, Rehnquist was no
hard core originalist, demonstrating a willingness to rely also on pre-
cedent and more general principles espoused by the Framers. 143 It is
Justices Scalia and Thomas who have pushed the stricter originalist
line in establishment cases. 144 In his Lee dissent, Scalia declared his
willingness to go wherever the formal interpretivist approach led. Not
only was "coercion" the appropriate model for judging Establishment
Clause injuries resulting from exposure to school prayer; Scalia saw
"no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion beyond [those]
acts backed by threat of penalty" that would have been familiar during
the revolutionary era-"a brand of coercion that, happily, is readily
discernible to those of us who have made a career of reading the disci-
ples of Blackstone rather than of Freud.' 45 As Scalia has acknowl-
139 Id. at 854, 862.
140 See Rakove, supra note 92, at 1602-03.
141 Scalia, supra note 14, at 855, 864.
142 SeeWallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The
true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history. . . .Any
deviation from [the Framers'] intentions frustrates the permanence of that Charter
and will only lead to the type of unprincipled decisionmaking that has plagued our
Establishment Clause cases since Everson.").
143 Id. ("As drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers inscribed the principles that
control today." (emphasis added)); see also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722 (2004)
(relying on Everson and the Memorial and Remonstrance to establish that states may
exclude the funding of clergy from general funding programs).
144 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 854-56
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Madison's writings support a position
of nonpreferential treatment of religion, but then distinguishing Madison's "more
extreme notions of the separation of church and state," observing that "the views of
one man do not establish the original understanding of the First Amendment").
145 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. ("The
Framers were indeed opposed to coercion of religious worship by the National Gov-
ernment; but, as their own sponsorship of nonsectarian prayer in public events dem-
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edged in the Eighth Amendment context, his brand of originalism is
not for the "faint-hearted."' 4 6 More recently in the Ten Command-
ments cases, Justices Scalia and Thomas have reasserted their fealty to
an originalist approach. After documenting religious acknowledg-
ments by early public officials, Scalia asserted in his McCreary dissent
that the Establishment Clause "was enshrined in the Constitution's
text, and these official actions show what it meant .... What is more
probative of the meaning of the Establishment Clause than the actions
of the very Congress that proposed it, and of the first President
charged with observing it?" 14 7 Thomas was equally explicit in his call
for a "return to the original meaning" of the Establishment Clause,
writing in his Van Orden concurrence that
our task would be far simpler if we returned to the original meaning
of the word "establishment" than it is under the various approaches
this Court now uses. The Framers understood an establishment
"necessarily [to] involve actual legal coercion." ... There is no ques-
tion that, based on the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause, the Ten Commandments display at issue here is
constitutional.
148
The problems with an originalist approach in Establishment
Clause adjudication are legend and well documented. 149 In a nut-
shell, originalism makes a false claim of judicial objectivity and passiv-
ity when, in reality, the methodology is as subjective and activist as the
approaches originalists disclaim. 150 It asserts the ability to identify and
decipher the most relevant sources, translate the discourse into un-
derstandable terms, and account for contextual matters. 51 Then, it
onstrates, they understood that '[s]peech is not coercive; the listener may do as he
likes."' (quoting Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting))).
146 Scalia, supra note 14, at 864.
147 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2754-55 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
148 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2865 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas,J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
149 See generally Kent Greenawalt, Originalism and the Religion Clauses: A Response to
Professor George, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 51 (1998) (describing the application of original-
ism to the Establishment Clause); Powell, supra note 90 (discussing problems with the
originalist approach).
150 Chemerinsky, supra note 91, at 918 ("History cannot serve the Court's goal of
constraining decisionmaking. At most, it provides an objective-sounding basis for the
Justices' subjective choices.").
151 Eisgruber, supra note 16, at 1623-24 ("Originalism supposes that historical
facts can be used to select among multiple, competing interpretations of the Constitu-
tion. The rhetorical treatment of popular sovereignty uses conclusions about consti-
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makes the claim that those deciphered pearls are not only relevant
but determinative for resolving current church-state conflicts. It ref-
uses to acknowledge what H. Jefferson Powell has termed the "most
fundamental of historical errors," that being "the failure to recognize
that the thoughts, concerns, motivations, and ideals of other eras were
not identical with our own and that, as a consequence, the actions of
past persons often were undertaken or understood in ways we would
regard as peculiar or even irrational." 152
That the Framers and their contemporaries used religious rheto-
ric and discourse is hardly surprising considering the earlier influence
of religion on education and intellectual thought.153 The Bible was
one of the few widely available books during the eighteenth century
and religious imagery and symbolism were common modes of com-
munication. 154 A recent book by Library of Congress historian James
Hutson documents the ubiquity of religious rhetoric among leading
figures during the Founding era.1 55 The more common such lan-
guage was during the Founding period, the less significance we can
attach to any particular statements; neither should we draw any con-
clusions from the aggregate use of religious language other than it
reflected contemporary eighteenth-century practices. The point is
that reliance on such material can be misleading for resolving present
legal conflicts.
The other problem with an originalist approach to the Establish-
ment Clause-assuming the earlier problems can be surmounted-is
that eighteenth-century views of religious liberty, equality, and church-
state interactions are simply ill suited for twenty-first-century America.
Originalists (and nonseparationists) may be correct that certain
tutional justice to select among multiple, competing interpretations of American
history.").
152 Powell, supra note 90, at 668.
153 See generally EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF THE FOUNDERS: RELIGION AND THE
NEW NATION, 1776-1826 (2004) (exploring the role of religion during the Found-
ing); James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and
Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74J. AM. Hisr. 9 (1987) (discussing the his-
tory and influence of religion on American culture and the American political sys-
tem); Harry S. Stout, Religion, Communications, and the Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution, 34 WM. & MARY Q. 519, 521-30 (1977) (discussing competing historical
accounts of the role of revivals and evangelical religion in shaping republican
ideology).
154 See generally THE BIBLE IN AMERICA: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL HISTORY (Nathan 0.
Hatch & Mark A. Noll eds., 1982) (providing a collection of essays on the influence of
the Bible on a range of American cultural traits).
155 THE FOUNDERS ON RELIGION: A BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (James H. Hutson ed.,
2005).
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church-state relationships existed in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries that do not conform to the Everson rendition of
history or to popular attitudes in a secular, postmodern society. My
own research has documented the prevalence of blasphemy prosecu-
tions and witness/jury disqualifications on account of religious belief
during the early nineteenth century. 156 As Justice Stevens noted in his
Van Orden dissent, there are many early official practices and attitudes
toward religion that we are no longer "willing to accept." 15 7 Justice
Story's oft-repeated statement about restricting First Amendment pro-
tection to Christians to the exclusion of other faiths stands as exhibit
number one. 158 The fact that several of the Framers supported gov-
ernment favoritism of Christianity over other faith traditions' 59-
something that Justice Scalia is willing to accept1 6-should not bind
our present interpretations of the Religion Clauses.
B. The Significance of the Blaine Amendment
Justice Thomas's plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms1 6 1 set the
stage for the most recent revival of interest in a historical approach to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. There, after proposing a trun-
cated approach for resolving funding controversies-asking simply
whether the government aid in question is distributed in a neutral
manner 1 62-Thomas launched into a blistering critique of the Court's
past funding jurisprudence, particularly the use of the "pervasively sec-
tarian" standard. 163 After demonstrating (correctly) that the standard
has never been rigorously applied to exclude religious participants in
government programs, Thomas asserted (somewhat inconsistently)
that the standard has a religious or sect-specific bias that the Court
156 See Steven K. Green, The Rhetoric and Reality of the "Christian Nation" Maxim
in American Law, 1810-1920, at 1-2, 26-28, 116, 149-59 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of North Carolina) (on file with author); see also MORTON BOR-
DEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS 98-100 (1984) (discussing the imposition of Christian
values on American common law).
157 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2885 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1871 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
159 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2885 (Stevens, J. dissenting); STORY, supra note 158,
§ 1871.
160 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2753 (2005) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
161 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
162 "In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and
indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neutrality,
upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to
their religion." Id. at 809 (plurality opinion).
163 Id. at 826-29.
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should now "disavow."' 64 According to Thomas, the exclusionary
standard had been applied almost exclusively to Catholic parochial
schools and found its origins in the failed Blaine Amendment of 1876
which would have prohibited constitutionally the public funding of
religious schools. 165 The Blaine Amendment, Thomas wrote, "arose
at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics
in general, and it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for
'Catholic ... ' This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried
now."
1 66
The Blaine Amendment, though unsuccessful for its original tar-
get, was purportedly influential and instrumental in the adoption of
no-funding provisions in several state constitutions. 167 (I say "purport-
edly," as many claims of a connection are based on assumptions and
are not extensively documented. Nevertheless, the timing of the
adoption of several state provisions and similarities in language sug-
gest, at a minimum, a purpose among many state drafters to incorpo-
rate the legal principles represented in the Blaine Amendment.) And
the Amendment-and the school funding controversy of the nine-
teenth century-has long been criticized for the presence of anti-
Catholic animus.168 Attacks on state no-funding provisions modeled
on the Blaine Amendment had already entered into the voucher liti-
gation in several states and became a side issue in the Zelman case. 169
Stated simply, the argument is that such provisions are invalid based
on the discriminatory motives of the framers of and advocates for the
measures, based on this historical evidence of Catholic bias. 170
164 Id. at 828.
165 Id. at 828-29.
166 Id. (citing Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 38 (1992)).
167 See Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amend-
ments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551,
573-76 (2003); Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious
Persecution, 72 FoRDt-tAM L. REV. 493, 512-23 (2003).
168 See HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 14, 193-251, 324-26; LLOYD P. JORGENSON,
THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925, at 216-17 (1987); JOSEPH P.
VITERI-ri, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCI-
ETY 18, 152-54 (1999); TobyJ. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86
VA. L. REV. 117, 134-40 (2000).
169 See Brief of State Petitioners at 45-46, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2001) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
170 As one critic has argued:
[T]he [no-funding] policy was not justified by any appeal to the abstract
principle of separation of church and state. The argument of the common
school leaders was simple and blunt: the growth of Catholicism was a men-
ace to republican institutions and must be curbed. Catholic schools, as a
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The relevance of this "bad history" came to a head in Locke v.
Davey.17 1 The State of Washington has a constitutional provision and
accompanying statute that prohibit public monies from being applied
to religious instruction, including barring financial aid to college stu-
dents studying theology. 172 When an otherwise qualified student was
denied a state scholarship based on his theological degree plans, he
sued claiming the state constitution and statute infringed on his free
exercise, free expression, and equal protection rights' 73 (and was in-
consistent with the Zelman Court's approval of private choice funding
mechanisms). 74 One line of attack was that Washington's two consti-
tutional provisions barring state financial assistance to religious
schools and degree programs reflected the influence if not command
of the Blaine Amendment and its accompanying anti-Catholic fer-
vor. 175 The Supreme Court, via Chief Justice Rehnquist, sidestepped
the issue, noting that the constitutional provision at issue-Article I,
§ 11-was unrelated to the 1889 Enabling Act which had required
Washington's Founders to include an express provision in the state
constitution ensuring that public school "'funds shall be ... free from
sectarian control or influence.'" 76 Rehnquist related that the prohi-
bition on the funding of clergy found support in several early state
constitutions, reflecting a widespread belief that such exclusions are
consistent with nonestablishment principles. 177 Still, Rehnquist threw
a bone to Blaine Amendment critics, repeating the assertion that the
Amendment "has been linked to anti-Catholicism.' 178
What now is the relevance of the Blaine Amendment for constitu-
tional adjudication? Has the Court conclusively determined the mean-
ing of the measure (and the pervasively sectarian doctrine) such that
contributing factor to the growth of the Church, must be restricted and, if
possible, suppressed.
JORGENSON, supra note 168, at 216.
171 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
172 Id. at 715-16.
173 Id. at 718.
174 Id. at 719 ("[T]he link between government funds and religious training is
broken by the independent and private choice of recipients." (citing Zelman, 536 U.S.
at 652)).
175 See WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11; id. art. IX, § 4.
176 Locke, 540 U.S. at 724 n.7 (quoting Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat.
676, 677) ("Neither Davey nor amici have established a credible connection between
the Blaine Amendment and Article I, § 11, the relevant constitutional provision. Ac-
cordingly, the Blaine Amendment's history is simply not before us."); see also WASH.
CONST. art. IX, § 4.
177 Locke, 540 U.S. at 722-23.
178 Id. at 723 n.7.
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all that is left is to establish a "credible connection" between the
Amendment and a state provision?179 At least one Blaine critic has
claimed in court filings that the Court has settled the historical inter-
pretation of the Amendment and the pervasively sectarian doctrine,
such that lower courts are obligated to follow that interpretation.18 0
Does this judicial interpretation of history now act as legal precedent?
Has the Court not only determined the law but the history as well?
Although there is little doubt that anti-Catholicism informed later
applications of the nonsectarian principle and the larger debate sur-
rounding the Blaine Amendment, that account is incomplete. Justice
Thomas arrived at his conclusion in Mitchell based primarily on the
historical arguments contained in one amicus brief.181 However, my
own research and that by Professor Noah Feldman indicates that his-
tory provides no definitive conclusions about the rationales behind
the Amendment and the no-funding principle. 8 2 The principle of
nonsectarian education and its corollary against funding sectarian ed-
ucation evolved prior to the influx of Irish Catholics in the late 1830s
and early 1840s.18 3 Several states enacted no-funding constitutional
provisions before or independent of the nativist and Know-Nothing
fervor of the 1850s.18 4 To be sure, nativists expropriated the concept
of church-state separation as a tool for Catholic suppression, but that
abuse did not hamstring others from embracing the concept on prin-
ciple.'8 5 And too, as John Jeffries and James Ryan have observed,
"[t] he divide between Protestants and Catholics was not merely theo-
logical; it was also political, cultural, and in some sense racial. ' 186
179 See generally Complaint para. 1, Puckett v. Rounds, Civ. No. 03-5033 (D.S.D.
Apr. 23, 2003), 2003 WL 23808470 (arguing that denying busing to school children
who attend religious schools violates "federal constitutional guarantees against relig-
ious discrimination").
180 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of
Appellants and of Reversal at 11, Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (Nos.
SC04-2323, SC04-2324, SC04-2325), 2005 WL 425133.
181 See Brief of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648), 1999 WL
638630.
182 See Noah Feldman, Non-Sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L. & POL. 65, 92-110
(2002); Steven K. Green, "Blaming Blaine": Understanding the Blaine Amendment and the
"No-Funding" Principle, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 107 (2003).
183 Green, supra note 182, at 118-124.
184 Id. at 118-28.
185 Feldman, supra note 182, at 112.
186 John C. Jeffries, Jr. &James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MIcH. L. REV. 279, 302 (2001).
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In addition, multiple interests influenced those who supported
the various versions of the Blaine Amendment. The Blaine Amend-
ment was not solely about Catholic bigotry; it was part of a larger con-
troversy over the responsibility and role of government in public
education: of which level of government-local, state, or national-
should direct its operation; whether that education should be truly
universal for all social and economic classes and races (including its
extension to the children of recently freed slaves); and whether that
education should be secular, nonsectarian, or more religious.1 8 7 Not
solely Catholics and nativists were involved in the controversy; other
groups and individuals became vested in the school question: evangel-
ical Protestants who sought to preserve the religious character of the
public schools, including the daily prayer and readings from the King
James Bible, liberal Protestants, free thinkers, and Jews who opposed
the religious exercises and nonsectarian character of the nation's
schools; conservative Protestants who viewed nonsectarian public
schooling as too secular and sought to increase its religious character;
and education and civil rights reformers who urged a larger govern-
ment role in funding and regulating public education. 88 Identifying
a singular motive for the Blaine Amendment is impossible.
Moreover, nineteenth-century opposition to public funding of re-
ligious schooling (or even contemporary concerns about the compati-
bility of Catholic schooling and democracy) should not be equated
with anti-Catholicism. With public schooling still in its nascent stage,
supporters of public education had legitimate concerns-both consti-
tutional and practical-about the affect of funding religious educa-
tion. As Stephen Macedo has written:
[I] t would be wrong to attribute the civic anxieties of this period to
racism alone, or to a simple desire to use public institutions to pro-
mote Protestantism for its own sake. It was not unreasonable for
Americans to worry about the fragility of their experiment in self-
government. There were also civic, secular reasons for fearing that
an education in orthodox Catholicism could be hostile to republi-
can attitudes and aspirations. Racism and anti-Catholic prejudice
were not the all-consuming motives of the era.' 8 9
187 See WARD M. McAFEE, RELIGION, RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL IN THE POLITICS OF THE 1870s, at 105-24 (1998).
188 Green, supra note 182, at 129-31.
189 STEPHEN MACEDO, DIvERsITY AND DISTRUST 63 (2000); see also Marc D. Stern,
Blaine Amendments, Anti-Catholicism, and Catholic Dogma, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 153,
176 (2003) (discussing the "legitimate" fears about the anti-democratic policies of the
nineteenth-century Catholic Church).
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All of this raises questions about the thoroughness of Justice
Thomas's Mitchell analysis. If the no-funding principle has a basis inde-
pendent from the history of anti-Catholicism, how should the latter
event affect the legitimacy of the former principle? Even assuming
anti-Catholicism was the driving force motivating supporters of non-
sectarian education (with its pervasively sectarian exclusion) and the
Blaine Amendments, how should that "fact" affect subsequent applica-
tions of the principle by the Court? Are those bad motives attributa-
ble to later generations of judges, lawmakers and public school
officials?' 90 These are questions that a selective and incomplete refer-
ence to history cannot answer.
C. The Ten Commandments and Pledge Cases
The belief that history can be a cipher for modern church-state
conflicts is best expressed in the types of conflicts represented in Ten
Commandments and Pledge of Allegiance cases. In both conflicts his-
tory played a crucial and recurrent role, involving not only the
claimed relationship of the practices to other historical acknowledg-
ments of religion but also the historical origins and longevity of the
practices themselves. Added to the lure of the historical life preserver
was the claim, made defiantly in McCreary and subtly in Van Orden, of
an indisputable historical relationship between the Ten Command-
ments and American law and government.' 91 And, significantly in
Van Orden, the recent history of public reaction to the monolith be-
came determinative of public perceptions of religious endorsement
and, so it seems, constitutionality.192
The Ten Commandments and Pledge cases present essentially
the same conflict: how to reconcile official government uses of relig-
ion that go beyond transitory acknowledgments of the nation's relig-
ious heritage with the command against government endorsements of
religion? Here is Marsh-redux, but without a specific historical excep-
tion to grandfather the ubiquitous and highly popular practices. Van
Orden and the Newdow concurring opinions reflect the same analysis,
here ungenerously termed "Marsh-light," relying on utterances and ac-
knowledgments of religion by early, leading public figures to prove
190 See Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 281-82 (1st Cir. 2005).
191 The comment accompanying the third rendition of the display in McCreary
read: "The Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the formation of West-
ern legal thought and the formation of our country .... The Ten Commandments
provide the moral background of the Declaration of Independence and the founda-
tion of our legal tradition." McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2731 (2005).




the practices are consistent with our constitutional traditions.1 93 The
apparent argument is that if George Washington, John Adams, Abra-
ham Lincoln et al., and early Congresses made religious statements
and issued religious proclamations, then: (1) those "facts" reflect the
prevailing early perspective about the appropriateness of such official
acknowledgments (i.e., these are the singularly important and rele-
vant reference points); (2) that these evidences further reflect an
early consensus about the constitutionality of such practices; (3) that
this consensus about acknowledgments generally can be applied to
the specific practice in issue; and (4) that that early opinion as to con-
stitutionality is relevant to, if not determinative of, current
controversies.
As can be seen, this analysis suffers from several of the fallacies
discussed above. (In truth, the opinions do not engage in "analysis" in
that they analyze the context or social and political dynamics sur-
rounding the statements and proclamations, but merely engage in a
selective listing of data.) Provided these are the relevant statements
and we can divine their meanings after accounting for rhetoric, mo-
tive and context, the Court's analysis assumes that the speakers spoke
with an awareness of the constitutional implications and potential fu-
ture applications of the practices in which they were engaged. In es-
sence, it requires that the Framers' actions were perpetually consistent
with their fealty to constitutional principles.19 4 Moreover, it assumes
that the Framers saw those principles as firmly established and static-
that the early conceptions of nonestablishment were fully developed
at the time the Framers spoke religiously, such that they would not
have desired a later opportunity to reevaluate their statements in light
of evolving notions of religious liberty. Also, it assumes that twenty-
first-century lawyers and judges can readily appreciate the full signifi-
cance of religious discourse during the eighteenth century. Appar-
ently, what historians have demonstrated about the ubiquity and
indeterminacy of religious language and imagery in eighteenth-cen-
tury political discourse is irrelevant.19 5 We should be cautious about
193 Id. at 2862-63; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26-30
(2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
194 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616 n.3 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
195 See generally DEREK H. DAVIS, RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774-1789, at 55 (2000) ("The convergence of the citizens' religious outlooks with
those of their political representatives was a combination that proved to make relig-
ious impulse one of the driving forces of the Continental Congress as it led the coun-
try through the . . . American Revolution."); GAUSTAD, supra note 153, at 134
(exploring the role of religion during the late eighteenth century and observing that
"in the realm of religion the opinions of men and women in those days varied
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putting much stock in isolated statements of early political figures who
may have mixed motives for choosing certain language.
Underlying the Van Orden Court's reliance on history was the
claim-presented most clearly in McCreary-about the unique histori-
cal relationship between the Ten Commandments and the develop-
ment of American law. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not directly
address the issue in his opinion, other than to mention that all three
branches of government have "acknowledged the historical role of the
Ten Commandments. '" 196 However, Justice Scalia in his McCreary dis-
sent restated the accepted view that the Ten Commandments have
made a "unique contribution to the development of the legal sys-
tem." 197 The problem is that, regardless of the popularity of this be-
lief of a unique status, it lacks historical support.198 There is no
evidence that early political and legal figures saw the Decalogue as
singularly (or even significantly) important or influential to American
law. 199 Early references to the Ten Commandments in legal docu-
ments, cases, and treatises are few and far between; where such refer-
ences appear, they are primarily illustrative or allegorical. 200 The
popular notion that the "Ten Commandments have profoundly influ-
enced the formation of Western legal thought" and serve as "the foun-
dation of our legal tradition" is unsubstantiated. 20 1 Where this belief
becomes problematic is when members of the Court repeat it as an
widely"); Paul F. Boiler, Jr., George Washington and Religious Liberty, 17 WM. & MARY Q.
486 (1960) (describing how many of Washington's statements extolling the virtues of
religious tolerance had very practical motivations, such as preventing dissension
among soldiers of different religious faiths and soliciting military aid from Canadian
Catholics); Kloppenberg, supra note 153, at 10 (discussing "the two themes of individ-
ual autonomy and popular sovereignty at the center of the American vision of politics
during the [eighteenth century]"); Isaac Kremnick, The "Great National Discussion"
The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 Wm. & MARY Q. 3, 4 (1988) (discussing four "distin-
guishable idioms" which coexisted in the discourse of politics from 1787 to 1788);
Stout, supra note 153, at 521 (claiming that movements around the time of the
Revolution "exhibited a close rhetorical affinity that infused religious and political
ideas with powerful social significance and ideological urgency").
196 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863.
197 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2759 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
id. (noting the "contribution that religion in general, and the Ten Commandments in
particular, have made to our Nation's legal and governmental heritage").
198 See Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Else-
where, 73 FoRIHAm L. REV. 1477, 1500-16 (2005); Steven K. Green, The Fount of Every-
thing Just and Right? The Ten Commandments as a Source of American Law, 14J. L. &
RELIGION 525, 558 (1999-2000).
199 Finkelman, supra note 198, at 1500-20.
200 Green, supra note 198, at 531-58.
201 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2731.
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established maxim, 20 2 such that the Court is again creating not only
law, but history.203
What is most revealing about the Court's inability to deal ade-
quately with history is the colloquy between Justices Scalia and Stevens
in their respective McCreary and Van Orden dissents. The two dissents
become a tit-for-tat over who has the better historical evidence at his
disposal. After relating many of the same official statements and proc-
lamations found in Rehnquist's Van Orden opinion, Scaliajabs at Ste-
vens, claiming the latter can appeal "to no official or even quasi-
official action in support of [his] view of the Establishment Clause"
other than Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, "written before the
federal Constitution had even been proposed, two letters written by
Madison long after he was President, and the quasi-official inaction of
Thomas Jefferson in refusing to issue a Thanksgiving Proclama-
tion. '20 4 Now the arbiter of relevant historical evidence, Madison's
Memorial is "irrelevant" while Jefferson's action is "notoriously self-con-
tradicting."20 5 Touch6! According to Scalia, "official actions [af-
firming religion] show what... [the Establishment Clause] meant."20 6
Scalia's superior historical skills are limited, as he does not acknowl-
edge his own sins of generality, the selectivity of sources, the failure of
explaining context, and his insistence on static concepts.
In response, Stevens also seeks to cabin the development of con-
stitutional thought by insisting that the only relevant views were of
those who were present at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.207
Despite his stumble, Stevens makes the stronger historical argument,
questioning Rehnquist and Scalia's selectivity of general sources and
their relevance. Disputing the tendency to portray a unified historical
narrative, Stevens demonstrates that the historical record is neither
uniform nor pellucid.208 Stevens correctly recognizes the limitations
of reliance on history, noting that narrow perspectives of many of the
Founders would be rejected by people today. "Fortunately," Stevens
asserts, "we are not bound by the Framers' expectations-we are
202 Id. at 2759-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203 Howr, supra note 15, at 3; see also MILLER, supra note 2, at 196 ("The distortion
of precedent is the concern particularly of lawyers .... History, however, belongs to
the public memory. Its use and misuse affects the political values of the nation. This
is especially so when it is the Supreme Court that is declaring the meaning of the past,
for it speaks with special public authority.").
204 McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2754 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2883 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 2884.
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bound by the legal principles they enshrined in our Constitution. '" 20 9
But unfortunately, Stevens is on the losing end of the debate. The use
of general history in Van Orden and the McCreary dissent will only in-
vite increased reliance on such unrelated or unexplained historical
sources. Van Orden and the McCreary and Newdow dissents sadly con-
firm Justice Kennedy's observation that the Marsh approach was not
an exception to Establishment Clause decisionmaking 2 10 but that it is
becoming a substitute for the endorsement standard in religious sym-
bolism cases.
D. Federalism
A fourth area that demonstrates the renewed interest in using
history to resolve Establishment Clause disputes is Justice Thomas's
call for a federalism interpretation of the Religion Clauses. 2 11 In sev-
eral recent concurring opinions Justice Thomas has resurrected the
argument that "the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision,
which, for this reason, resists incorporation. '" 2 12 As he explained in
Newdow, the "text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly
suggest that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress
from interfering with state establishments [of religion]. '"213 Under
this approach,
it may well be that state action [in the Establishment Clause con-
text] should be evaluated on different terms than similar action by
the Federal Government .... Thus, while the Federal Government
may "make no law respecting an establishment of religion," the
States may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters so
long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other
individual religious liberty interest.2 14
Thomas's call for a federalism constraint on the application of
the Establishment Clause is, of course, not new; ever since the Court
incorporated the clause in 1947215 critics have charged that freedom
from religious establishments does not constitute an individual liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
209 Id. at 2890.
210 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
211 See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring); Cutter v. Wilkinson,
125 S. Ct. 2113, 2125-28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment);
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
212 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 45-46 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
213 Id. at 49.
214 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 678-79 (Thomas, J., concurring).
215 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Amendment.2 16 A few, like Justice Thomas, have gone further to ar-
gue that rather than intending for the Establishment Clause to forbid
a host of government practices "respecting an establishment of relig-
ion," the Framers consciously designed the clause to leave the then
existing state of religious establishments intact.
217
Following Everson, the popularity of the federalism interpretation
waned under the weight of subsequent Establishment Clause hold-
ings.2 18 Most scholars acknowledged an original federalism aspect to
the Religion Clauses-disabling federal authority over religious mat-
ters-but argued that the Framers likely believed the clause served
other purposes, such that federalism was only one of several possible
understandings. 2 19 Indeed, scholars who otherwise supported the
Court's separationist holdings conceded that, based on the existence
of state establishments in 1789, federalism considerations likely in-
formed the Framers' thinking.2 20 However, in the late 1980s a new
round of federalism critiques arose, this time by authors who claimed
that federalism concerns represented the sole or overriding considera-
tion of those who drafted the Establishment Clause. 22 1 Gerard Brad-
216 See HoWAE, supra note 15, at 19-20; WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS 9 (1964); Corwin, supra note 32, at 19;Joseph M. Snee, Religious Dises-
tablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371.
217 According to one critic writing in 1954, the First Amendment "is not only an
express guarantee of personal religious freedom against the threat of federal action,
but also an application of the principle of federalism .... The two [religion] clauses
together were intended to remove the subject of religion completely from the federal
competence." Snee, supra note 216, at 389.
218 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-55 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("It has been suggested, with some support in history, that absorption of the
First Amendment's ban against congressional legislation 'respecting an establishment
of religion' is conceptually impossible because the Framers meant the Establishment
Clause also to foreclose any attempt by Congress to disestablish the existing official
state churches. Whether or not such was the understanding of the Framers ... are
questions not dispositive of our present inquiry .... Any such objective of the First
Amendment, having become historical anachronism by 1868, cannot be thought to
have deterred the absorption of the Establishment Clause . . . . [T]he Fourteenth
Amendment created a panoply of new federal rights for the protection of citizens of
the various states. And among those rights was freedom from such state governmen-
tal involvement in the affairs of religion as the Establishment Clause had originally
foreclosed on the part of Congress.").
219 See HowE, supra note 15, at 29; Snee, supra note 216, at 389.
220 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed.
1988); Laycock, supra note 114, at 416; William Van Alstyne, Comment, Trends in the
Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984
DUKE L.J. 770, 773.
221 BRADLEY, supra note 68, at 92; Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1113, 1133-34 (1988).
2oo6] 1749
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ley wrote in 1987 that the final language of the Religion Clauses
"tracked the federalist view that Congress had no enumerated author-
ity over religion in the first place, as well as the basic antifederalist
endeavor to preserve existing state constitutional regimes from inter-
meddling federal legislation. '" 222 According to this new critique, the
only point of consensus among the disparate factions during drafting
and ratification was one of federalism: to exclude federal authority
over all religious matters, leaving all regulation, pro and con, to the
states.223 Moreover, due to the impossibility of consensus on a mean-
ing among the Framers, this critique argues the clause lacks a substan-
tive quality-that it is primarily, if not solely, a jurisdictional device.
As Steven Smith wrote in the mid-1990s, "The religion clauses were
understood as a federalist measure, not as the enactment of any sub-
stantive principle of religious freedom."224
The implications of this federalism critique are obvious. If there
is no substantive meaning to the Establishment Clause, then all of the
Court's church-state holdings-at least those where the Court has re-
lied on the Jeffersonian-Madisonian interpretation of the clause-lack
legitimacy. But more significantly, the federalism critique argues that
incorporation of the Establishment Clause should be rolled back,
along with many of the Court decisions restricting state practices sup-
222 BRADLEY, supra note 68, at 92.
223 Conkle, supra note 221, at 1133-34.
224 STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 30 (1995). Additionally, Smith wrote, " [T] he relig-
ion clauses were purely jurisdictional in nature; they did not adopt any substantive
right or principle of religious freedom." Id. at 17; accord AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 246 (1998) (" [A]s originally written, [the
Establishment Clause] stood as a pure federalism provision .... [T]he clause was
utterly agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment; it simply mandated that the
issue be decided state by state and that Congress keep its hands off, that Congress
make no law 'respecting' the vexed question."); see also DREISBACH, supra note 6, at 61
(arguing that the "prevailing interpretation" of the Establishment Clause was that it
was not meant to apply to state governments); James J. Knicely, "First Principles" and
the Misplacement of the "Wall of Separation": Too Late in the Day for a Cure?, 52 DRAKE L.
REV. 171, 174-75 (2003) (recognizing the renewal of doubts in recent years concern-
ing the Supreme Court's incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the
states); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1085, 1089-92 (1995) (recognizing the fed-
eral government's role of remaining agnostic concerning religious establishments
under the Establishment Clause); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment
Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1191, 1198-202




porting religion.225 "[A]bandoning [incorporation] would certainly
give the states far more latitude to acknowledge, accommodate, and
promote religion than current doctrine allows." 226 And potentially,
"[i]f the Establishment Clause were not applied to the states, states
would ostensibly be free to establish a state church or to give aid or
preference to a particular religion."227 While a tax assessment for
Methodists in Oregon would likely succumb to an equal protection or
free exercise challenge, let alone to state nonestablishment provi-
sions,228 there would be no federal bar to official acknowledgments of
religion, nonsectarian school prayer, or many forms of nonpreferen-
tial aid to religion. As Justice Thomas remarked in Van Orden, "If the
Establishment Clause does not restrain the States, then it has no appli-
cation here, where only state action is at issue. '229
While not all advocates call for disincorporation, most argue that
the historical record indicates that the Framers believed the states
should have leeway in their own church-state relationships, such that
rights could take on different meanings vis-a-vis the federal and state
governments. Like Justice Thomas, they insist that states should be
able to fashion funding and other supportive relationships with relig-
ious institutions, constrained only by free exercise or equal protection
interests. 230 States and locales would be able to design laws and poli-
225 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("I would acknowledge that the Establishment Clause
is a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation."); see also
Knicely, supra note 224, at 225-27 (noting the presumption of regularity granted to
state actions in Establishment Clause decisions); Lietzau, supra note 224, at 1193 (ar-
guing that incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states is not mandated
or permitted); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist
View, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1700, 1714-17 (1992) (arguing that no great harm would
result from abandoning Everson, but the states could gain several advantages by aban-
doning the case).
226 Note, supra note 225, at 1715.
227 Knicely, supra note 224, at 220.
228 See OR. CONST. art. 1, § 5 ("No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the
benefit of any religeous [sic] or theological institution . . ").
229 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2865 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Another manifestation of this federalism trend, although not tied directly to the Es-
tablishment Clause and producing an opposite result, is the outcome in Locke v. Da-
vey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), where the Court held that "we have long said that 'there is
room for play in the joints' between [the Religion Clauses]" that provides state flexi-
bility in legislating on religious matters. Id. at 718 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). Thus a greater emphasis on federalism may allow states to
provide greater guarantees of separation of church and state.
230 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49-50 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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cies to satisfy the religious preferences of the prevailing majorities
while allowing for greater experimentation in education and public
benefits programs. 231 Separationism, if it continued to exist as a con-
cept, would be up to each state.
This renewed emphasis on a federalism interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause is another example of bad history. It takes an is-
sue of undeniable importance to the drafters and ratifiers of the Bill
of Rights and gives it meaning that the Framers likely did not pos-
sess. 232 That the drafters of the First Amendment were concerned
about limiting federal power is hardly profound; the entire purpose of
the Bill of Rights was to limit federal authority in relation to individ-
ual's and state's rights. It is an entirely different question whether the
Framers were also of the opinion that: (1) the Establishment Clause
had no additional meaning other than that of federalism; or (2) that
they intended the Establishment Clause to protect and preserve the ex-
isting state establishments, rather than have them die on their own
accord.2 33
The federalism argument relies to a large degree on the "fact"
that six or seven states maintained religious establishments at the time
of the ratification of the Constitution and drafting of the First Amend-
ment. Members of Congress from those states would not have agreed
to any provision that could have been used to dismantle those existing
church-state arrangements. 23 4 The problem with this interpretation is
that it imposes a modern view of what constitutes an establishment on
the historical record and fails to take into account the diversity of
practices that existed within the various states. Federalism advocates
wrongfully assume that because the practices in the early state estab-
lishments are inconsistent with modern concepts of nonestablish-
ment, late eighteenth-century observers would have viewed them as
similarly inconsistent. However, representatives from states with active
assessment systems generally claimed that their states did not maintain
religious establishments because they were: (1) not exclusive but non-
preferential; (2) that public support of religion was for the benefit of
civil society, not religion; and (3) that their assessment systems did not
231 Note, supra note 225, at 1715.
232 See Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38
CREIGHTON L. REv. 761, 774-94 (2005).
233 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 51 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(" [I] ncorporation ... would prohibit precisely what the Establishment Clause was
intended to protect-state establishments of religion.").
234 See Green, supra note 232, at 774-80.
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violate rights of conscience. 23 5 Only Connecticut officially acknowl-
edged its establishment in its charter, though its officials, like those in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire would have been reticent to admit
to one due to the negative connotation the term carried with its asso-
ciation to hated European establishments. 236 As such, when the First
Congress convened and considered proposed amendments to the
Constitution, there was little reason for delegates to be concerned
about preserving state religious "establishments" against federal inter-
meddling. Moreover, because disestablishment was the clear trend
among the states, there was little reason for the drafters to secure state
establishments through the First Amendment (or to waste political
capital on the issue of state establishments). Finally, the vast majority
of calls for a religious provision in the federal constitution centered
on protecting rights of conscience and ensuring sect equality, not on
securing existing state religious establishments. 237 All of this suggests
that the Framers' federalism concerns were limited to disabling the
national government from involvement in religious affairs, not with
maintaining state establishments.
Federalism was thus an issue in the drafting of the Establishment
Clause, but primarily in the sense that all of the proposed amend-
ments reflected a shared desire to limit the powers of the general gov-
ernment vis-A-vis the states. But an amendment to restrict federal
power by prohibiting federal involvement in religious matters is not
the same thing as an amendment designed to preserve state establishments.
By focusing on this one impulse to the exclusion of other animating
influences, Justice Thomas has again engaged in bad history.
CONCLUSION
History can be an indispensable tool for resolving Religion Clause
conflicts. It can instruct and enlighten our understandings about our
constitutional structure and relationships. It can inform us of our past
so that we can learn from and build on those experiences. But history
cannot provide answers to modern constitutional questions because
history can never provide "answers" any more than it can provide
"truths." At best, history is a handmaiden to judicial decisionmaking,
not a taskmaster. Considered from this perspective, the recent em-
phasis on history as a panacea for Religion Clause decisionmaking is
235 CuRRY, supra note 128, at 174-75, 184; 1 WILLIAM G. McLoUGHLIN, NEw EN-
GLAND DISSENT, 1630-1883, at 610-11 (1971).
236 Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 875, 906 (1986).
237 See Green, supra note 232, at 783-85.
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troubling. The problems with relying on a historical methodology
have been known for a long time, but apparently the lure of history is
too great for some to resist. The ongoing resort to history for resolv-
ing Religion Clause conflicts only confirms the adage that those who
do not learn the lessons from the misuse of the past are condemned
to repeat them.
